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Abstract. Deep learning models, which are increasingly being used in
the field of medical image analysis, come with a major security risk,
namely, their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Adversarial exam-
ples are carefully crafted samples that force machine learning models to
make mistakes during testing time. These malicious samples have been
shown to be highly effective in misguiding classification tasks. However,
research on the influence of adversarial examples on segmentation is sig-
nificantly lacking. Given that a large portion of medical imaging prob-
lems are effectively segmentation problems, we analyze the impact of
adversarial examples on deep learning-based image segmentation mod-
els. Specifically, we expose the vulnerability of these models to adver-
sarial examples by proposing the Adaptive Segmentation Mask Attack
(ASMA). This novel algorithm makes it possible to craft targeted ad-
versarial examples that come with (1) high intersection-over-union rates
between the target adversarial mask and the prediction and (2) with
perturbation that is, for the most part, invisible to the bare eye. We
lay out experimental and visual evidence by showing results obtained
for the ISIC skin lesion segmentation challenge and the problem of glau-
coma optic disc segmentation. An implementation of this algorithm and
additional examples can be found at https://github.com/utkuozbulak/
adaptive-segmentation-mask-attack.
1 Introduction
Recent studies adopt deep learning models at a quick pace to solve image-related
problems for medical data sets. Provided that (1) labor expenses (i.e., salaries
of nurses, doctors, and other relevant personnel) are a key driver of high costs in
the medical field and that (2) increasingly super-human results are obtained by
machine learning systems, an ongoing discussion is to replace or augment manual
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Genuine Image
Prediction: Cancer
Confidence: 0.95
Perturbation
(Enhanced × 100 )
Adversarial Example
Prediction: Healthy
Confidence: 0.99
Fig. 1. A genuine image, initially classified as cancer with 0.95 confidence by a deep
learning model, is perturbed to become an adversarial example. This adversarial ex-
ample is then classified as healthy with 0.99 confidence by the same model.
labor with automation for a number of medical diagnosis tasks [6]. However,
a recent development called adversarial examples showed that deep learning
models are vulnerable to gradient-based attacks [12]. These so-called adversarial
examples are now considered a major security flaw, since they allow for the use
of possible fraud schemes (e.g., for insurance claims) when deep learning models
are deployed for clinical tasks [6].
The study of adversarial examples started with [12], in which the authors
observed that small pixel modifications led to large changes in the prediction.
Ever since, numerous attempts were made to mitigate the impact of adversarial
examples and to fix this so-called security flaw, only to be found ineffective by
subsequent studies [3]. Although the effects of adversarial examples are largely
studied for non-medical datasets, it was also shown that classification problems
in medical imaging datasets are of no exception to this exploit [6]. An adversarial
example in the context of breast cancer classification is given in Figure 1.
In the field of non-medical imaging, pixel by pixel detail is most of the time
not task critical. As a result, segmentation problems are often expressed as de-
tection or localization problems [5]. However, in medical imaging, precision is of
utmost importance. Therefore, instead of detection or localization, segmentation
covers a large portion of medical imaging problems [8].
Even though adversarial examples are studied extensively in the context of
classification problems, it is only recently that studies started to investigate
this phenomenon in the context of segmentation problems [1,13]. Thus far, in
terms of segmentation, adversarial examples have been studied for the Pascal
VOC [5] and Cityscapes [4] data sets, with a sole adversarial example generation
method proposed in [13]. In particular, the Dense Adversary Generation (DAG)
algorithm proposed in [13] aims to force deep learning models to segment all
pixels wrong. Although the authors report that their algorithm is able to create
adversarial examples in the context of segmentation, the resulting segmentation
predictions, especially in the medical domain, are not realistic (i.e., the shape of
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the prediction immediately gives away that the input has been tampered with,
since the prediction shape is not specified).
In this study, we focus on analyzing adversarial examples in the context
of medical image segmentation problems. We demonstrate that adversarial ex-
amples indeed exist when dealing with medical image segmentation problems,
discussing examples that have been obtained for glaucoma optic disc segmen-
tation [10] and ISIC skin lesion segmentation [7]. Furthermore, we introduce a
novel algorithm that is tailored to produce targeted adversarial examples for
image segmentation problems.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the impact
of adversarial examples, not only in the context of medical imaging but also in
the case where the nature of the prediction is binary. Additionally, our algorithm
is the first approach towards producing targeted adversarial examples for image
segmentation that leads to a convincing prediction shape of choice, thus exposing
a large security threat for image segmentation models. Our algorithm, while
achieving targeted predictions with a high success rate, modifies the original
image so subtly that the modifications on the original image are, for the most
part, invisible to the bare eye.
2 Notation and Framework
In this section, we explain the datasets, the deep learning models, the notation,
and the evaluation metrics used throughout the paper.
Framework — In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach,
we evaluate our attack on two datasets: the first one is the glaucoma optic disc
segmentation dataset [10] and the second one is the ISIC skin lesion segmenta-
tion dataset [7]. The results reported in Section 4 are obtained for two separate
U-Net models which is one of the most used architectures in the field of medical
segmentation [11]. These U-Net models have been trained on the two afore-
mentioned datasets, achieving a segmentation effectiveness comparable to the
state-of-the-art.
Neural Network Notation — We define the forward pass in a neural
network as a function g with the weights and parameters of the same network
detailed as θ. This function takes an input image X of size C ×H ×W , with C,
H, and W representing the number of channels (i.e., 1 for grayscale images, 3 for
colored images), the height, and the width of the input image, respectively. In
this setting, g(θ,X) represents the prediction of this neural network for a given
input image X. The prediction is of size M × H × W , where M is the total
number of classes (e.g., two in the case of binary segmentation). We define Y :=
arg maxM (g(θ,X)) as the prediction of the neural network after discretization,
containing prediction classes (i.e., values from 0 to M − 1) per pixel and having
a size of H ×W .
Distance Metrics — When an adversarial example is generated, a distance
metric is required in order to measure the difference between the original image
and the generated image. Following previous studies [2], we use the Euclidian dis-
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tance (L2) and the max distance (L∞), with the latter measuring the maximum
change for a single pixel among all pixels.
Accuracy Metrics — In order to quantify the accuracy of the adversarial
example generation, we calculate the intersection over union (IoU) and the pixel
accuracy (PA) between the target mask and the predicted segmentation mask
associated with the adversarial example produced. In our settings where the
background label is selected as 0, IoU and PA are defined as follows:
IoU(Y1,Y2) =
∑
i,j
Ai,j ∩Bi,j
/∑
i,j
Bi,j , PA(Y
1,Y2) =
∑
i,j
Ai,j
/
(H ×W ),
for (i, j) ∈ ({1, · · · , H}, {1, · · · ,W}) and where Ai,j = 1{Y2i,j =Y1i,j} and Bi,j =
1{Y2i,j +Y1i,j 6=0}, with 1 representing the indicator function.
3 Generating Adversarial Examples
To justify our design choices, we briefly highlight the differences between clas-
sification and segmentation in terms of adversarial example generation, before
detailing our algorithm for generating adversarial examples for image segmenta-
tion.
Adversarial Target — In classification, the adversarial target is often a
single class [9]. However, in segmentation, the target is a mask. Thus, the aim is
to change the prediction of not just one but of a large number of labels.
Perturbation Multiplier — In the case of classification (when a single
class is targeted), the optimization is influenced by only one source. However,
in segmentation, as a consequence of the adversarial target being a mask, the
optimization is influenced by a large number of sources (i.e., individual pixels).
As a result, the perturbation multiplier (i.e., the learning rate) is harder to tune.
Keeping the aforementioned differences in mind and building upon the knowl-
edge acquired from studying adversarial examples in classification problems, we
propose the Adaptive Segmentation Mask Attack (ASMA), a novel algorithm
for generating targeted adversarial examples for image segmentation models.
3.1 Adaptive Segmentation Mask Attack (ASMA)
As a starting point, we use the standard way of adversarial example generation,
which is defined as follows:
minimize ||X − (X+P) ||2 ,
such that arg max
(
g(θ, (X+P))
)
= YA , (X+P) ∈ [0, 1]C×H×W .
This equation iteratively aims at finding a small perturbation P that is suf-
ficient to change the prediction of the model to YA, which we will refer to as
the target adversarial mask, while keeping the L2 distance between the original
image X and its adversarial counterpart X+P minimal. In this setting, a pertur-
bation is calculated in an iterative manner, multiplied with a constant, and then
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Fig. 2. An example adversarial optimization mask used by the static and the dynamic
mask approaches, visualized in terms of the difference between the initial prediction
and the targeted prediction.
added to the image: Xn+1 = Xn + αPn. We now detail how the perturbation
Pn is calculated.
Static Segmentation Mask (SSM) — In the context of adversariality,
a targeted segmentation attack must (i) increase the prediction likelihood of
the selected foreground pixels in the target adversarial mask (i.e., blue areas in
the static adversarial optimization mask in Figure 2), while (ii) reducing the
prediction likelihood of all other pixels that are not specified in the same mask
(i.e., red areas in the static adversarial optimization mask in Figure 2). To achieve
this property, we write Pn as a sum of perturbations as follows:
Pn =
M−1∑
c=0
∇x
(
g(θ,Xn)c  1{YA = c}
)
, (1)
where  denotes the Hadamard product and YA, again, denotes the desired
prediction mask for the adversarial example that contains class labels (as shown
in Figure 2). g(θ,X)c, on the other hand, denotes the channels of the prediction
made by the neural network (i.e., in the case of binary prediction, c = 0 for
background channel and c = 1 for foreground channel).
We will now describe how we improve this approach.
Adaptive Segmentation Mask (ASM) — When the static mask ap-
proach is used to generate adversarial examples, the gradient is sourced from
the same number of target pixels in the target adversarial mask at each iter-
ation. However, during the adversarial optimization, the prediction of certain
pixels may already be correct (e.g., gray areas in the dynamic masks given in
Figure 2), and may thus not require any further optimization. In order to ensure
that the optimization is only sourced from pixels whose predictions are not in
line with the target adversarial mask, we introduce an approach that makes use
of adaptive mask targeting. To achieve this property, we write Pn as follows:
Pn =
M−1∑
c=0
∇x
(
g(θ,Xn)c  1{YA = c}  1{argmaxM (g(θ,Xn)) 6= c}
)
. (2)
Writing Pn this way ensures that the gradient is only sourced from pixels
whose labels are different from the target adversarial mask at each iteration.
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Table 1. Experimental results in terms of image modification and prediction mask
accuracy. We highlight the L2 distances and IoU overlaps to emphasize the increase in
the effectiveness of the optimization technique between the first and the last version.
Note that numbers listed in this table are calculated for images whose pixel values are
between 0 and 1.
Glaucoma Dataset ISIC Skin Lesion Dataset
Modification Accuracy Modification Accuracy
Optimization L2 L∞ IoU PA L2 L∞ IoU PA
SSM
4.60 0.22 47% 94% 11.76 0.24 43% 88%
±1.76 ±0.09 ±18% ±2% ±4.11 0.05 ±15% ±2%
ASM
2.82 0.17 94% 99% 4.11 0.16 89% 98%
±1.29 ±0.09 ±7% ±1% ±2.23 ±0.10 ±9% ±1%
ASM + DPM 2.47 0.17 97% 99% 3.88 0.16 89% 98%
(ASMA) ±1.05 ±0.09 ±2% ±1% ±1.99 ±0.09 ±10% ±1%
Using the proposed adaptive segmentation mask approach, the number of
pixels that source the optimization process starts high and as the prediction
becomes in line with the target adversarial mask, lessens gradually.
Dynamic Perturbation Multiplier (DPM) — Since the usage of ASM
progressively reduces the number of pixels the optimization sources from, setting
the perturbation multiplier α to a fixed number either causes the optimization
to halt when α is low or causes it to create large perturbations when α is high.
Therefore, we employ a dynamic perturbation multiplier strategy in our adaptive
mask approach, using αn = β × IoU(YA,Yn) + τ , where β and τ are parameters
used to calculate the final perturbation multiplier, also taking into account the
IoU score of the prediction at the nth iteration. This method allows increasing
the value of the multiplier dynamically as the number of pixels to be optimized
decreases.
We name the adversarial example generation method that incorporates the
aforementioned techniques (i.e., ASM and DPM) the Adaptive Segmentation
Mask Attack (ASMA). Note our algorithm also works in the case where the
prediction is not binary.
4 Experiments
Table 1 presents quantitative results on the viability of the proposed algorithm
for adversarial example generation. Specifically, Table 1 shows the degree of per-
turbation in terms of L2 and L∞ distances, as well as the mask accuracy of
the produced adversarial examples in terms of IoU and PA, hereby detailing
the influence of the incremental updates (i.e., SSM, ASM, and DPM) that were
discussed in Section 3.1. The values that can be found in Table 1 have been
determined by calculating the mean and the standard deviation obtained from
the optimization of 1000 adversarial examples. For each of those optimizations,
the target adversarial mask is randomly selected among the masks of the other
samples, so to have a realistic target in terms of medical image segmentation.
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Fig. 3. An example optimization of an adversarial example for segmentation using
ASMA. Best viewed in color.
To find an optimal perturbation multiplier when DPM is not incorporated, we
used α ∈ {1e−8, 1e−7, 1e−6, 1e−5}; when DPM is incorporated into the opti-
mization, we use β ∈ {1e−6, 5e−6, 1e−5} and τ = 1e−7. Results are listed for
the experiment that achieves the highest average IoU score throughout the 1000
generated adversarial examples for the selected set of parameters.
As can be observed from Table 1, the proposed method, when all enhance-
ments introduced in Section 3.1 are incorporated, achieves 97% and 89% IoU
overlap with the target mask that was used for initiating the optimization, with
L2 perturbations as low as 2.47 and 3.88 for the glaucoma optic disc and the
ISIC skin lesion segmentation problems, respectively. For a more intuitive under-
standing, an L2 perturbation of 3.88 corresponds to a modification of less than
1% of the images used in this study. Our experiments showed that, using ASMA,
tuning the perturbation multiplier parameters β and τ is not a difficult task, as
we were able to achieve high IOU overlap with low L2 and L∞ perturbations
with only 3 possible combinations of β.
Apart from the quantitative results presented in Table 1, we also provide a
qualitative overview of the approach used to generate adversarial examples in
Figure 3. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the optimization procedure, a generated
adversarial example, and the resulting predicted segmentation for a sample taken
from the glaucoma optic disc dataset [10]. As can be seen, our algorithm is able
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to completely change the prediction to the desired output mask (taken from
another sample in the dataset) with an IoU success rate of 98%.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we demonstrated that deep learning-based models for medical im-
age segmentation are vulnerable to attacks using adversarial examples, hereby
focusing on skin lesion and glaucoma optic disc segmentation. Specifically, we in-
troduced the Adaptive Mask Segmentation Attack, a novel algorithm that is able
to produce adversarial examples with realistic prediction masks that have been
altered to be misclassified, using perturbations mostly invisible to the human eye.
The source code of our adversarial attack, as well as additional examples, can be
found at https://github.com/utkuozbulak/adaptive-segmentation-mask-attack.
Although we were able to observe similar results on different models, as
well as transferability of our generated adversarial examples to other models,
we leave it to future work to perform a more detailed analysis and to examine
corresponding novel defense mechanisms against attacks that leverage realistic
prediction masks.
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